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The Influence of Accounting Changes on Financial Analysts’
Forecast Accuracy and Forecasting Superiority
Abstract
This study assesses the inﬂuence of discretionary accounting changes on ﬁnan-
cial analysts’ individual forecast errors in the Netherlands from 1988 to 1996. It
contributes to previous research by examining whether accounting changes (1)
inﬂuence analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy because of the change in the time
series of earnings; and (2) change analysts’ forecasting superiority relative to me-
chanical earnings prediction models. The empirical results indicate that changes
in accounting procedures signiﬁcantly aﬀect analysts’ forecast accuracy and fore-
casting superiority.
Keywords: Accounting changes, ﬁnancial analysts, forecast accuracy, forecasting
superiority
1 INTRODUCTION
This study investigates whether discretionary accounting changes inﬂuence ﬁnancial analysts’
earnings forecasting. A characteristic that distinguishes earnings forecasting from many other
decision making processes is the availability of serially correlated historical earnings data.
Analysts can use these data to extrapolate earnings trends and forecast future earnings.
Accounting changes, which aﬀect the time series of earnings numbers, are therefore expected
to inﬂuence ﬁnancial analysts’ forecast precision. Prior research has addressed this issue
(Brown, 1983; Elliott and Philbrick, 1990).
This study contributes to this line of research by examining whether accounting changes
(1) inﬂuence analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy because of the change in the time series
of earnings; and (2) change analysts’ forecasting superiority that they have over mechanical
earnings prediction models because of the change in the composition of earnings. Accounting
changes distort earnings trends but also aﬀect the composition of earnings numbers, which
could have an inﬂuence on analysts’ forecasting performance relative to the forecasting per-
formance of mechanical prediction models. For instance, Bartov and Bodnar (1996) indicate
that ﬁrms may change accounting procedures to reduce the degree of information asymme-
try between managers and investors. From their perspective managers of ﬁrms with high
information asymmetries have the incentive to choose accounting procedures that are more
informative of future performance. Additionally, by adopting new accounting procedures
ﬁrms could be moving towards an industry norm, which may facilitate interﬁrm comparisons.
Thus, if the newly adopted accounting procedures are either more informative or more in
accordance with generally adopted procedures, ﬁnancial analysts’ forecasting superiority over
a time series model may increase, even though their forecast accuracy may decrease.
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This paper compares earnings forecast errors in change years and years following a ma-
terial change in accounting procedures to forecast properties in years prior to a change. The
analysis considers a diverse set of accounting changes adopted by ﬁrms in the Netherlands
from 1988 to 1996. I divide the sample into categories according to whether changes aﬀect
earnings before extraordinary items (EBEI), net proﬁt or equity. Contrary to my predictions
accounting changes without a material eﬀect on EBEI have a larger negative inﬂuence on
forecast accuracy, both in change years and in the ﬁrst year after a change. However, ad-
ditional tests indicate that forecast accuracy only worsens after the adoption of accounting
changes that are accompanied by an increase in my proxy for information asymmetry during
the ﬁscal year. These results suggest that it is not so much the earnings eﬀect as a change in
the information environment, that determines forecast accuracy after an accounting change.
I further conclude that accounting changes from current cost accounting to historical cost
accounting and changes from expensing to capitalisation improve forecast accuracy in years
following the change.
In this paper I also develop a simple earnings predictability measure, based on mechanical
model prediction errors, and regress it on analysts’ consensus forecast errors prior to, dur-
ing and after change years. The regression analysis reveals that previously disclosed EBEI
changes, changes from expensing to capitalisation and changes from current cost accounting to
historical cost accounting result in far lower associations between the predictability measure
and forecast errors, which suggests that analysts’ forecasting superiority increases after these
accounting changes. That is, after these changes analysts become not only more accurate but
also more superior forecasters in the sense that they are able to correct for a larger fraction
of the mechanical model prediction errors than they were able to prior to these changes.
This study diﬀers from prior investigations in several respects. First, this study explicitly
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considers the diﬀerential consequences of EBEI changes and equity or net proﬁt changes. Sec-
ond, earlier research did not explicitly measure earnings predictability and scarcely focused on
analysts’ forecasting superiority over mechanical prediction models prior to, during and after
change years. Third, this study extends US-oriented studies of Brown (1983) and Elliott and
Philbrick (1990) to a broader, non-US context. The Dutch accounting environment diﬀers
from the US environment by its less strict disclosure requirements. Two distinctive character-
istics of the Dutch requirements concerning the adoption of accounting changes may constitute
an important determinant of the inﬂuence of accounting changes on analysts’ forecast accu-
racy. First, Dutch companies are allowed to present the eﬀect of a change in accounting
principles on the ﬁnancial ﬁgures of the preceding year instead of the ﬁnancial ﬁgures of the
current year. Second, contrary to disclosure requirements in the United States, Dutch com-
panies are not obliged to restate ﬁgures for prior years in the historical summary. Because
of these two diﬀerences, analysts following a Dutch company access a diﬀerent information
set than those following US companies. Furthermore, this paper considers an accounting
change that has not been considered in previous research. It explicitly discusses the inﬂuence
of changes from current cost accounting to historical cost accounting on forecast accuracy.
In the Netherlands many companies have reverted to historical cost accounting in the past
decade after a period in which current cost accounting was widely used.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews some of the
literature on accounting changes and earnings forecasts and describes the hypotheses. Section
3 describes the data selection. The research design and empirical ﬁndings are discussed in
sections 4 and 5. Section 6 concludes this paper with some additional comments.
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2 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
(i) The Inﬂuence of the Earnings Eﬀect of Accounting Changes
This study builds partly upon US-studies by Elliott and Philbrick (1990), Brown (1983) and an
investigation of Dutch analysts’ ﬁxation on accounting ﬁgures by Vergoossen (1997). Elliott
and Philbrick investigate 612 accounting changes for the years 1976 to 1984 and conclude
that in the presence of changes without prior disclosure earnings forecasts in change years are
signiﬁcantly less accurate than forecasts in non-change years. Prior disclosure means that the
pending accounting change is publicly announced prior to the earnings announcement date.
Vergoossen examines Dutch analysts’ investment reports. Results from his study indicate
that Dutch ﬁnancial analysts may ignore changes in accounting policies, especially when the
level of disclosure about the change is low.
These studies show that the presence of an accounting change can be expected to impair
ﬁnancial analysts’ forecast accuracy as analysts may ignore the impact that such a change
has on reported earnings. Therefore, the following hypothesis applies:
H1: In change years ﬁnancial analysts’ forecast accuracy is worse than forecast accuracy in
years prior to an accounting change.
Alternatively, some studies suggest that management uses accruals to manage earnings
towards earnings forecasts (Bannister and Newman, 1996; Degeorge et al., 1999), which would
improve forecast accuracy due to the presence of accounting changes. Although there is some
evidence of the use of accounting changes for earnings management (see e.g. Sweeney, 1994),
I assume that this explanation is less likely, since the use of changes in accounting principles
is more costly than other types of accrual manipulation (see Healy, 1985) and the accounting
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change also aﬀects future earnings in a presently unknown direction.
The expectation that accounting changes aﬀect forecast accuracy is based on the as-
sumption that analysts forecast reported earnings as opposed to permanent earnings. This
assumption is consistent with the ﬁndings of Mest and Plummer (1999), which indicate that
analysts forecast persistent earnings over longer forecast horizons, but incorporate transitory
earnings components in their short-term forecasts. My study focuses on earnings forecasts
of which the forecast horizons are less that one year (short-term forecasts). It is therefore
reasonable to assume that these forecasts incorporate transitory earnings components, such
as the earnings eﬀect of accounting changes.1
Brown (1983) examines forecast errors in the year after the accounting change. His study
indicates that earnings forecasts are only slightly aﬀected and that forecasts are less inﬂu-
enced by the change when management provides additional disclosures, such as pro forma
adjustments. This study also evaluates forecast accuracy in the years immediately after the
accounting change. I expect that the inﬂuence of an accounting change on the predictability
of future earnings is threefold. First, the change eﬀect constitutes a temporary distortion
of earnings trends, which decreases earnings predictability, particularly in the earliest years
after the change. Analysts following Dutch companies may have insuﬃcient information to
extrapolate earnings trends after the presence of an accounting change, since these compa-
nies are not obliged to restate ﬁgures for prior years in the historical summary. Second, the
newly adopted accounting procedures can either increase or decrease the variability of earn-
ings, which aﬀects the predictive value of reported earnings in subsequent years. That is, an
accounting change that leads to a more regular earnings pattern can enhance the usefulness
of current earnings in forecasting future earnings. Third, the accounting change can aﬀect
the predictive value of other (ﬁnancial) information. For example, a change from historical
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cost accounting to current cost accounting alters the relationship between market prices and
earnings and consequently aﬀects the usefulness of market prices in predicting earnings.
Whereas the inﬂuence of the last two factors diﬀers with the type of change, the inﬂuence
of the ﬁrst factor on forecast accuracy is generally negative for all types of changes. It is
therefore hypothesised that the average eﬀect is a decrease in forecast accuracy in the years
immediately after the change.
H2: In years following the accounting change ﬁnancial analysts’ forecast accuracy is worse
than forecast accuracy in years prior to the change, on average.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 both predict that ﬁnancial analysts do not fully incorporate the
change eﬀect in their earnings forecasts, either due to a lack of knowledge or lack of ability.
In order to test whether changes in forecast accuracy are attributable to the change eﬀect,
I split the sample of accounting changes used in this study into changes with a material
eﬀect on earnings before extraordinary items (EBEI changes) and changes with a material
eﬀect on net proﬁt or equity (non-EBEI changes). In this paper I deﬁne material changes
as accounting changes with an eﬀect exceeding ﬁve percent of either equity or income.2 I
expect that in change years EBEI changes have a larger negative eﬀect on forecast accuracy
than non-EBEI changes, since forecasts used in this study generally are forecasts of earnings
before extraordinary items. I expect that EBEI changes also have a larger negative eﬀect
on accuracy than non-EBEI changes in years subsequent to an accounting change, since the
earnings eﬀect of EBEI changes causes a larger distortion of earnings trends.
H3: Accounting changes with a material eﬀect on earnings before extraordinary items (EBEI
changes) have a larger negative impact on ﬁnancial analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy,
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both in change years and subsequent years, than accounting changes which aﬀect only
net proﬁt or equity materially.
(ii) Prior Disclosure
In order to investigate the importance of analysts’ knowledge relative to ability in adequately
incorporating the eﬀect of an accounting change, this study diﬀerentiates the data sample
according to whether the accounting changes have been disclosed previously. I deﬁne prior
disclosure as the explicit mention of an accounting change in the annual report of the ﬁrst
year prior to a change year.3 In practice the disclosure of a pending accounting change often
consists of the announcement that management intends to change the accounting principles
underlying next year’s annual report and a description of the type of change, without a
quantitative speciﬁcation of the size of the change eﬀect. As noted, earlier studies on ﬁnancial
analysts and accounting changes show that the level of disclosure aﬀects the analysts’ ability
to cope with the eﬀects of a change (Elliott and Philbrick, 1990; Vergoossen, 1997). I therefore
expect that prior disclosure reduces the inﬂuence of accounting changes on forecast accuracy.
H4: Accounting changes that are not disclosed one year prior to the change increase forecast
errors relative to previously disclosed accounting changes.
(iii) Expensing to Capitalisation and Current Cost to Historical Cost
The previous hypotheses focus on the average eﬀect of accounting changes on forecast ac-
curacy. Since diﬀerent accounting procedures may lead to diﬀerent levels of earnings pre-
dictability, it is useful to additionally focus on the individual eﬀects of particular types of
accounting changes.4 In this paper I speciﬁcally examine the inﬂuence on forecast accuracy
of changes from current cost accounting to historical cost accounting (hereafter referred to as
7
CCA to HCA changes) and changes from expensing to capitalisation.
I expect that these two types of accounting changes improve analysts’ forecast accuracy.
The reason for this is that these changes remove unpredictable components from earnings. For
instance, earnings based on current cost accounting depend on changes in the value of assets
that become known at year end. This means that in predicting earnings ﬁnancial analysts also
have to predict changes in the market value of assets, which makes accurately forecasting more
diﬃcult (see Basu et al., 1998). CCA to HCA changes remove the current cost component
from earnings, thereby improving earnings predictability. The same argument may hold
for changes from expensing to capitalisation. Examples of such changes are changes from
expensing to capitalisation of insurance companies’ policy acquisition costs or changes from
expensing to capitalisation of goodwill. These changes remove the less predictable acquisition
costs or goodwill charges from earnings, which is likely to improve analysts’ forecast accuracy.
In addition, these two particular types of accounting changes can reduce the variability
of reported earnings. This can be explained as follows. Since earnings simply represent the
diﬀerence between sales and costs, the variance of reported earnings can be deﬁned as a
function of the variances and covariance of sales and costs. Hence, the variance of earnings
based on current cost accounting exceeds the variance of earnings based on historical cost
accounting if the current value of assets exhibits a fairly irregular pattern or if ﬁrms do not
succeed in regularly adjusting prices to current costs (aﬀecting the covariance of costs and
sales).5 The eﬀect of changes from expensing to capitalisation on the variability of reported
earnings is relatively straightforward. Diﬀerences in amount or frequency of goodwill charges
or acquisition costs result in the fact that capitalisation and systematic amortisation smoothes
reported earnings.6 If analysts make use of trend extrapolation in earnings forecasting, a
reduction in the variability of earnings would improve analysts’ forecast accuracy. This leads
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to the following hypotheses:
H5A: Financial analysts’ forecast accuracy in years after changes from current cost accounting
to historical cost accounting is higher than forecast accuracy in years prior to these
changes.
H5B: Financial analysts’ forecast accuracy in years after changes from expensing to capitali-
sation is higher than forecast accuracy in years prior to these changes.
(iv) Analysts’ Forecasting Superiority
The central idea underlying hypotheses 5A and 5B is that changes from current cost ac-
counting to historical cost accounting and changes from expensing to capitalisation remove
unpredictable components from earnings and result in less variable earnings. This should
have a positive inﬂuence on analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. An implicit assumption in
evaluating accounting procedures based on forecast accuracy is that ﬁnancial reporting aims
to provide information that helps analysts in forecasting earnings. However, the objective
of ﬁnancial reporting is probably not so much improving analysts’ trend extrapolations as
it is improving the information set that analysts use to assess a company’s economic perfor-
mance. An interesting question therefore is whether particular accounting procedures make
companies’ ﬁnancial reporting more informative about future company performance or better
to understand, to such an extent that analysts’ forecast accuracy can increase relative to the
accuracy of mechanical prediction models. This section addresses this question.
Early studies of analysts’ forecasting abilities indicate that ﬁnancial analysts have an
information advantage over mechanical earnings prediction models (see e.g. Brown et al.,
1987; Kross et al., 1990), which makes analysts superior earnings forecasters. The analysts’
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superiority increases as more information becomes available. Brown et al. (1987) deﬁne
analysts’ forecasting superiority (FAFSUP) as the ratio of the squared mechanical model
prediction errors (σ2MMFE) and the squared analyst forecast errors (σ
2
AFE):
FAFSUP =
σ2MMFE
σ2AFE
(1)
which decreases towards one when analysts’ forecasting advantage over mechanical prediction
models decreases.
The companies in my sample that changed from current cost accounting to historical cost
accounting generally motivated their change by stating that the newly adopted procedures
were more in alignment with nationally and internationally accepted accounting procedures.
The companies changing from expensing to capitalisation mostly motivated their change by
stating that the newly adopted procedures provided better insights into company performance
through improved matching of expenses with beneﬁts. These reported motivations provide
a ﬁrst indication that these two accounting changes could increase analysts’ information ad-
vantage over mechanical prediction models, either through facilitating interﬁrm comparisons
or through improving the informativeness of ﬁnancial statements.
When Philips Electronics decided to revert to historical cost accounting in 1992, Het
Financieele Dagblad (Dutch ﬁnancial newspaper) responded that
in accounting technical sense, all this can be regarded as a step backwards. But when
it all becomes so complex that only a specialist can understand it, then it can be said
that they have missed their objective. And the less perfect but more understandable
method used now should be preferred primarily because it increases comparability with
other companies (quoted in Schattke and Vergoossen, 1996).
Concerns over a reduction in reliability of ﬁnancial statement information due to the adoption
of current cost accounting were expressed by the Financial Accounting Policy Committee of
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the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR, 1993, pp. 38-45). These
concerns indicate that when companies use current cost accounting, analysts probably ﬁnd
diﬃculty in understanding and anticipating the current cost component of earnings. I there-
fore expect that companies’ abandonment of current cost accounting makes their ﬁnancial
reports better to understand and more informative (e.g. due to an increase in reliability).
This means that after a CCA to HCA change, analysts’ information advantage over me-
chanical prediction models increases, which makes them more superior forecasters, as argued
above.
When companies change from expensing to capitalisation of costs, they signal that these
costs are an asset to the company. This implies that capitalising and amortising these costs
could provide useful information on a company’s future proﬁtability. Furthermore, capitali-
sation and amortisation improves the matching of expenses with beneﬁts, which enhances the
informativeness of the company’s ﬁnancial statements. I therefore expect that after changes
from expensing to capitalisation analysts’ forecast errors decrease relative to the mechani-
cal model prediction errors, resulting in an increase in analysts’ forecasting superiority. The
following hypothesis applies:
H6: Analysts’ forecasting superiority, deﬁned as the ratio of the squared mechanical model
prediction errors and the squared analyst forecast errors, is higher in years after changes
from current cost accounting to historical cost accounting and changes from expensing
to capitalisation than it is in years prior to these changes.
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3 SAMPLE SELECTION
(i) Accounting Changes
This study restricts the examination of accounting changes to discretionary changes in ac-
counting principles. That is, it excludes changes in accounting estimates and changes in
reporting entity. This ensures that deﬁnitions of accounting changes of both international
and Dutch accounting standards cover the events studied herein and facilitates comparisons
with similar studies. This study does not account for adjustments in accounting principles as
a result of mergers and acquisitions either, since in these cases non-accounting factors likely
distort forecast accuracy.
Legislation and guidelines concerning the adoption of accounting changes in the Nether-
lands are fairly similar to those of other industrialised countries. Distinctive features of Dutch
accounting practices are that almost all of the accounting changes adopted by ﬁrms in the
Netherlands are discretionary and that ﬁrms may choose whether the cumulative eﬀect is
reﬂected in shareholders’ equity or in the income statement (as extraordinary income or ex-
pense). Furthermore, Dutch guidelines require that companies adjust their ﬁnancial statement
of the preceding year to the newly adopted accounting changes for the purpose of compari-
son only. Dutch companies are not obliged to restate ﬁgures for prior years in the historical
summary.
The accounting change data come from the annual reports of 243 companies listed on the
Amsterdam Stock Exchange during 1988 to 1996 for one or more years. Out of 1,355 ﬁrm-year
observations 228 annual reports (16.8 percent) contained at least one accounting change. 125
changes, reported in 102 annual reports (7.5 percent), had an eﬀect of ﬁve percent or more on
shareholders’ equity (hereafter equity) or income. Of these changes 80 (64 percent) aﬀected
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earnings before extraordinary items materially.
The inﬂuence on earnings forecast properties of changes with an eﬀect of ﬁve percent
or more on either income before extraordinary items or net proﬁt/equity is central to this
investigation. Table 1 presents the accounting changes that meet this criterion, which shows
that these changes are spread over years. I remove ﬁrms having changes in two consecutive
years from the sample and classify ﬁrm-year observations with more than one accounting
change in a year as follows. If at least one change aﬀects earnings before extraordinary items
materially, I classify these observations as EBEI-changes. I choose the type of change based
on the largest change eﬀect.
[Table 1 about here.]
(ii) Earnings Forecasts and Share Prices
Earnings forecast errors (ERRist) of ﬁrm i and analyst s at time t have the following deﬁni-
tions:
ERRist =
|Fist − Eit|
Pit
(2)
in which Fist, Eit, and Pit denote earnings per share forecast, reported earnings per share and
share price of ﬁrm i and analyst s at time t respectively.
I/B/E/S International Inc. has provided analysts’ individual earnings forecasts from 1987
to 1996. Stock prices come from Datastream. Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics of
earnings forecast errors from 1987 to 1996. This study examines analysts’ initial one-year-
horizon earnings forecast. The initial one-year-horizon forecast is the ﬁrst forecast of current
year’s earnings that an analyst submitted to I/B/E/S after the earnings announcement date
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of the previous ﬁscal year. Table 2 reports the average number of days between the forecast
submission date and the ﬁscal year end. The mean forecast horizon of the initial earnings
forecasts varies from 169 days in the second year after the changes to 183 days in the ﬁrst
year after the changes.
The number of analysts following ﬁrms with accounting changes ranges from 1 to 41.
Furthermore, Table 2 shows that the number of analysts following a given ﬁrm ﬂuctuates
over the time period. The average number of analysts increases from 22 in the second year
prior to the change year to 30 in the second year after the change year.
[Table 2 about here.]
4 ANALYSTS’ FORECAST ACCURACY
(i) Nonparametric Tests
Part of the research methods used in this study are similar to those of previous studies. When
comparing forecast accuracy in years prior to the accounting change with accuracy in the
change year or in years after the accounting change, Brown (1983) and Elliott and Philbrick
(1990) apply Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests to diﬀerences in earnings forecast errors, since non-
normality of their data reduces the validity of parametric t-tests. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank
test ranks diﬀerences between paired absolute forecast errors in ascending order and tests
whether the mean rank of negative diﬀerences is statistically distinguishable from the mean
rank of positive diﬀerences. Using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test requires symmetrically but
not necessarily normally distributed observations.
Shapiro-Wilk tests indicate that the data used in this study exhibit a statistically signif-
icant departure from normality.7 Therefore, I assess the inﬂuence of accounting changes
14
on forecast errors by using a Wilcoxon matched pairs signed rank test. Matched pairs
are (ERRist,ERRist−1), (ERRist+1,ERRist−1) and (ERRist+2,ERRist−1).8 I also determine
whether the inﬂuence of an accounting change is equal for two independent subsamples, such
as EBEI changes and non-EBEI changes, by using a Wilcoxon Rank Sum test. This test
ranks the diﬀerences between forecast errors of the total sample and tests whether the mean
ranks of both subsamples are statistically diﬀerent.9
Comparing forecast accuracy to accuracy in prior years may suﬀer from the fact that on
average accuracy improves through the years.10 Therefore, the analysis considers whether
the observed changes in forecast accuracy are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from changes in forecast
accuracy of a control group. To construct this control sample, I use all available ﬁrm-year
observations of the ﬁrms that did not adopt a material accounting change from 1988 to 1996
and for which both earnings forecasts and share price data were available. For each individual
forecast of a given change ﬁrm, the control sample contains a forecast which is of a non-change
ﬁrm of approximately equal size in terms of analyst following in the change year and which
is submitted in the same ﬁscal year.11 This forecast is randomly drawn from all available
earnings forecasts. I match each sample containing the observations of change ﬁrms with 500
control samples, which are randomly drawn from the population of non-change ﬁrms, and
base all z-statistics on the averages of the 500 rank sums.
(ii) The Inﬂuence of the Change Eﬀect and Prior Disclosure
Panel A of Table 3 shows the results of Wilcoxon tests on the diﬀerence between forecast
errors in the change year and forecast errors in the year prior to the change. The results do
not support hypothesis 1, i.e., that analysts’ forecast accuracy is worse in the change year
than in prior years. When comparing changes in forecast accuracy in the presence of an
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accounting change with changes in forecast accuracy of the control sample, it appears that
accounting changes with a material eﬀect on EBEI have a positive eﬀect on the accuracy
of individual earnings forecasts (z=−2.20, p<0.05). The inﬂuence of non-EBEI accounting
changes on forecast accuracy is signiﬁcantly negative (z=1.96, p<0.05).
The impairment of forecast accuracy due to non-EBEI changes continues in the ﬁrst
year after the change (z=2.28, p<0.05). The inﬂuence of an accounting change on forecast
accuracy appears not to persist after the ﬁrst year subsequent to the change. However, since
the percentages of increased forecast errors after EBEI changes and non-EBEI changes are
30.9 percent and 56.2 percent, respectively, the loss of signiﬁcance in the second year after
the change may be due to lower statistical power because of the much smaller sample size.
These results do not support hypothesis 2, which predicts that forecast accuracy is worse in
the years after an accounting change, and hypothesis 3, which predicts that EBEI changes
have a larger negative eﬀect on forecast accuracy than non-EBEI changes.
[Table 3 about here.]
The positive inﬂuence of EBEI changes on forecast accuracy indicates that either in pres-
ence of an EBEI change management provides analysts with better information than usual or
management uses these changes to manipulate earnings towards forecasts. Partitioning the
sample of accounting changes on prior disclosure tests the validity of these explanations. In
order to fully assess the eﬀect of announcements of an accounting change one year prior to
the earnings release date, I divide the sample of changes according to whether or not changes
have been disclosed in the annual report one year prior to the earnings release date. Table 4
presents the results.
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[Table 4 about here.]
The positive inﬂuence of EBEI changes on forecast accuracy is only signiﬁcant when these
changes have been previously disclosed (z=−2.35, p<0.05). This implies that management
decided to adopt these changes long before the earnings announcement date of the change
year, which makes it less likely that management adopted these changes for the purpose of
earnings management. Prior disclosure of non-EBEI changes appears to have a negative eﬀect
on forecast accuracy. Panel B of Table 4 shows that non-EBEI changes only impair analysts’
earnings forecasts if these changes are previously disclosed (z=3.65, p<0.01). These results
raise the question as to whether non-EBEI changes are accompanied by the release of worse
information than usual and EBEI changes are accompanied by the release of better informa-
tion than usual. I examine in the next section whether changes in companies’ information
environment in the years surrounding the accounting change can explain increased forecast
accuracy in the presence of EBEI changes and decreased forecast accuracy in the presence of
non-EBEI changes.
In sum, I conclude that prior disclosure aﬀects earnings forecast accuracy in change years,
but in diﬀerent directions, depending on the type of change. However, the results are in con-
trast with the prediction of hypothesis 4, i.e., that accounting changes that are not disclosed
one year prior to the change increase forecast errors relative to previously disclosed account-
ing changes. These results demonstrate that the observed earnings forecast improvements in
the presence of certain EBEI changes cannot be attributed to companies using the change
to manage earnings towards analysts’ predictions, since on average only companies that have
disclosed the intention to change in previous year’s annual report, show increased forecast
accuracy. In the next section I conduct two additional tests to ﬁnd out why some of the
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results are contrary to my expectations.
(iii) Additional Tests of the Eﬀect of EBEI and Non-EBEI Changes
The non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests that I used in the previous section reduce the
inﬂuence of the size of forecast accuracy changes by ranking the diﬀerences between paired
absolute forecast errors, as described above. My objective to use Wilcoxon Signed Rank
tests is that the data used in this analysis exhibit a signiﬁcant departure from normality.
An alternative solution to non-normality problems is to use parametric bootstrapped t-tests.
However, the inﬂuence of the size of forecast accuracy changes on bootstrapped t-tests is
larger than its inﬂuence on Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests.
Bootstrapped t-statistics on changes in forecast accuracy in the year of an EBEI change
and in the ﬁrst year after an EBEI change conﬁrm my expectations that accuracy worsens
after these changes (t=2.48 and t=4.68, respectively). However, after removing the highest
absolute values of changes in forecast errors from my sample, the sign of the t-statistics tends
to reverse. This suggests that although Wilcoxon tests indicate that the average eﬀect of
accounting changes on forecast accuracy is positive, in some instances EBEI changes can
have a largely negative eﬀect on forecast accuracy.
The large negative eﬀect of EBEI changes on some of the examined earnings forecasts is in
accordance with my prior expectations. However, the question remains why Wilcoxon tests
indicate that analysts’ forecast accuracy improves after EBEI changes, on average. The fact
that some of the empirical results are contrary to expectations, warrants explicit attention
for alternative determinants of analysts’ forecast accuracy.
To examine whether other determinants of forecast accuracy are driving my results, I
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estimate the following regression equation:
∆INDERRist = γ0 + γ1FOLLOWit + γ2HORIZONist + γ3DSTDit + υit (3)
in which ∆INDERRist denotes the signed rank of the change in the individual forecast error
of analyst s for company i from the ﬁrst year prior to the accounting change to year t,
FOLLOWit denotes the number of analysts producing earnings forecasts for company i in
year t, HORIZONist denotes the number of days between the forecast date of the forecast of
analyst s and the ﬁscal year end date of company i in year t. DSTDit is an indicator variable
that equals one if the standard deviation of the abnormal stock returns of company i has
decreased after the publication of the annual report of year t-1. I measure the standard
deviation of abnormal stock returns prior (after) to the publication of the annual report of
year t-1 over a one-year period which ends three months after the ﬁscal year end of year t-1
(year t).
The standard deviation deviation of abnormal stock returns proxies for the level of infor-
mation asymmetry between management and investors, which determines investors’ uncer-
tainty about future company performance (see e.g. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999).
I include the variable DSTDit to examine whether the signed ranks can be explained by changes
in the companies’ information environment. For example, I test whether forecast accuracy
improvements in the presence of EBEI changes can be explained by decreases in the level of
information asymmetry after the publication of the annual report of the ﬁrst year prior to
the accounting change. The intercept of equation 3, γ0, measures the extent to which the
signed ranks are diﬀerent from zero after controlling for changes in forecast horizon, analyst
following and investor uncertainty. I use a bootstrapping method to estimate equation 3.
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This ensures that the reported bootstrapped t-statistic of γ0 approximates the z-statistic of
a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test. Table 5 reports the bootstrapped coeﬃcients and t-statistics.
[Table 5 about here.]
Panel A of Table 5 shows that after controlling for changes in forecast horizon and changes
in analyst following, signed ranks of forecast accuracy changes in the presence of EBEI changes
remain signiﬁcantly negative (t=−2.23, p<0.05), indicating that forecast accuracy improves.
However, after including DSTDit the intercept is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The
coeﬃcient on DSTDit is negative and marginally signiﬁcant (t=−1.91, p<0.10), indicating that
in the presence of EBEI changes forecast accuracy only improves when the level of information
asymmetry has decreased in comparison with information asymmetry in the previous ﬁscal
year. The coeﬃcients for non-EBEI changes indicate that the observed worsening of forecast
accuracy in the presence of non-EBEI changes is attributable to increases in the level of
information asymmetry. Signed ranks of forecast accuracy changes are signiﬁcantly positive
when the level of information asymmetry has increased (t=6.05, p<0.01), but negative when
the level of information asymmetry has decreased. Panel B of Table 5 further shows that after
controlling for changes in analyst following, forecast horizon and information asymmetry, the
signed ranks of forecast accuracy changes in the ﬁrst year after EBEI changes or non-EBEI
changes are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The additional regression analysis thus indicates that changes in forecast accuracy in
change years and years after an accounting change can be explained by changes in the level of
information asymmetry. The analysis suggests that since non-EBEI changes impair forecast
accuracy, these accounting changes are on average part of a deterioration of the company’s
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information environment. EBEI changes are on average part of an improvement of the com-
pany’s information environment.
(iv) Expensing to Capitalisation and Current Cost to Historical Cost
Since diﬀerent accounting procedures may lead to diﬀerent levels of earnings predictability, I
also examine the eﬀect of two particular accounting changes. Of all changes documented in
this study, changes from expensing to capitalisation of costs and changes from current cost
accounting to historical cost accounting (CCA to HCA) are considered to be predictability-
improving changes, as argued above. Table 6 shows the results of a partition on earnings
predictability. In order to test whether changes in forecast accuracy are permanent, I compare
forecast errors in the two years after the accounting changes with forecast errors in the ﬁrst
year prior to the changes. The results support hypothesis 5A, which predicts that CCA
to HCA changes improve forecast accuracy in the years after the accounting change. The
diﬀerence between CCA to HCA changes and other accounting changes is fairly similar for
EBEI changes and non-EBEI changes (z=−11.64, p<0.01 for EBEI changes, z=−2.65, p<0.01
for non-EBEI changes). The observed decrease in forecast errors after CCA to HCA changes
shows that management’s accounting choice can positively aﬀect forecast accuracy.
A signiﬁcant part of the changes from expense to capitalisation without a material inﬂu-
ence on earnings before extraordinary items do not remove an unpredictable component, such
as goodwill charges or policy acquisition costs, from earnings. Examples of such accounting
changes are the changes from directly charging goodwill to equity to capitalisation of goodwill.
When analyzing the eﬀect on forecast accuracy of the removal of an unpredictable component,
the focus therefore should be on EBEI changes. Panel A of Table 6 shows the eﬀect of EBEI
changes from expense to capitalisation of forecast accuracy in the years after the change.
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Although forecast accuracy increases after these accounting changes (t=−2.18, p<0.05), the
accuracy improvement is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the accuracy improvement after other
changes (t=0.09). Based on these results I reject hypothesis 5B.
After removing CCA to HCA changes or changes from expensing to capitalisation from the
total sample of accounting changes, it appears that the remaining changes decrease forecast
accuracy relative to the forecast accuracy of the control group (z=2.35, p<0.05). This is
in accordance with my expectation that accounting changes worsen forecast accuracy in the
years after the change (see hypothesis 2).
[Table 6 about here.]
5 ANALYSTS’ FORECASTING SUPERIORITY
(i) Regression Analysis
Hypothesis 6 predicts that ﬁnancial analysts’ forecasting superiority increases after CCA to
HCA changes and changes from expensing to capitalisation. Previous studies deﬁne analysts’
superiority as the ratio of the squared mechanical model prediction errors and the squared
analyst forecast errors. If analysts following ﬁrm i have the ability to accurately correct for
a fraction κ of the mechanical model prediction error, their superiority measure will equal:
FAFSUP =
σ2MMFE
σ2AFE
=
1
(1− κi)2 (4)
in which σ2MMFE denotes the variance of the mechanical model prediction errors and σ
2
AFE
denotes the variance of analysts’ forecast errors.
Consider the following regression equation:
AFEi = α0i + α1iMMFEi + υi (5)
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Since analysts following ﬁrm i are able to accurately correct for a fraction κ of the mechanical
model prediction error, the best estimate of α1i is 1−κ. This illustrates that α1i decreases with
the forecasting superiority of analysts following ﬁrm i (FAFSUP, as deﬁned by equation 4).
Regressing analysts’ forecast errors on mechanical model prediction errors therefore provides
insight into analysts’ forecasting superiority.
In order to test hypothesis 6, I estimate a regression equation that is similar to equa-
tion 5. This requires developing a measure of the accuracy of mechanical prediction models,
hereafter referred to as earnings (un)predictability. Earlier studies of Lys and Soo (1995) and
Das et al. (1998) have constructed a composite earnings predictability measure which is based
on a stock return model and/or earnings time-series. This paper uses a similar approach. I
measure earnings unpredictability as follows. Using all available earnings data between 1987
and 1996 of the ﬁrms that made an accounting change during this period, I estimate the
following three earnings prediction models:12
1.
2.
3.
Random walk model:
Autoregressive model:
Returns model:
Eit = Eit−1 + it
Eit = φ0 + φ1Eit−1 + υit
Eit = α0 + α1Rit + ηit
in which earnings are scaled by stock prices at the beginning of the ﬁscal year. Stock returns
(Rit) have the following deﬁnition:
Rit =
Pit − Pi,t−1
Pi,t−1
(6)
in which Pit denotes the share price of ﬁrm i at time t.13 The stock returns are computed
from nine months prior to the beginning of the ﬁscal year to three months after the ﬁscal year-
end. The returns model thus measures to what extent the information which is conveyed by
share prices in the two years prior to the earnings announcement date, is helpful in predicting
earnings.
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The unpredictability measure (UPit) is equal to the sum of the absolute values of (stan-
dardised) forecast errors it, υit and ηit, that is:
UPit = (|it/σ|+ |υit/συ|+ |ηit/ση |) (7)
Hence, a high unpredictability score implies that historical (earnings) information is less useful
in predicting reported earnings and that mechanical prediction models are less accurate. I
choose to equally weigh standardised errors of the three diﬀerent models because this avoids
making arbitrary assumptions about which of these models best reﬂects analysts forecasting
process. Standardisation of the error terms insures that if one of the models estimates worse
than the other models, it could not drive the results and conclusions would not be based on
the worst model.
Finally, I rank the unpredictability scores in ascending order and transform the ranks to
normally distributed rank scores with mean 0 and variance 1. This solves problems with
forecast error outliers in statistical analyses. Since the presence of an accounting change is
likely to cause forecast error outliers, these outliers most likely provide valuable information.
Using a rank transformation procedure guarantees that the outliers are part of the analysis,
but do not drive the results.14
In order to test hypothesis 6, i.e., that analysts’ forecasting superiority is higher in years
after CCA to HCA changes and changes from expensing to capitalisation than it is in years
prior to these changes, I estimate the following equation:
CONSERRit = β0 + β1UPit + β2FOLLOWit + β3SIZEit +
+β4DACit + β5D
AFTER
it + β6D
DISC
it + β7D
PRED
it +
+β8DACit UPit + β9D
AFTER
it UPit +
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+β10DDISCit UPit + β11D
PRED
it UPit + εit (8)
in which CONSERRit denotes the consensus forecast error, that is the average initial one-
year-horizon forecast error. Dummy variable DACit (D
AFTER
it ) equals 1 if ﬁrm i makes an
accounting change in (before) year t. Dummy variable DPREDit equals 1 if ﬁrm i has adopted
CCA to HCA changes or changes from expensing to capitalisation before year t and DDISCit
equals 1 if ﬁrm i has disclosed the presence of an accounting change one year prior to the
change. UPit denotes the unpredictability rank of ﬁrm i in year t. FOLLOWit equals the
number of analysts that follows ﬁrm i in year t, SIZEit equals the market value of common
equity of ﬁrm i at the ﬁscal year-end. These two variables should control for the eﬀect of
diﬀerences in analyst following and size on forecast accuracy (cf. Das et al., 1998).
I accept hypothesis 6 when the relationship between ﬁnancial analysts’ forecast errors
and earnings unpredictability is less pronounced in years after CCA to HCA changes and
changes from expensing to capitalisation than it is in years prior to these changes (β11 < 0).
Including DAFTERit UP in the regression equation ensures that D
PREDUP measures the extent
to which the eﬀect on analysts’ forecasting superiority of CCA to HCA changes and changes
from expensing to capitalisation is diﬀerent from the eﬀect of all other accounting changes
(instead of diﬀerent from zero). I further include DACit UP and D
DISC
it UP to gain insight into
the eﬀect of accounting changes on analysts’ forecasting superiority in the change year.
One of the assumptions underlying Ordinary Least Squares regressions is that the error
terms of a regression are normally distributed. This assumption may not be valid when ana-
lysts’ forecast errors are the dependent variable, since the forecast errors are absolute values.
This may lead to non-normality of the error term distribution. Shapiro-Wilk tests on the
residuals of the Ordinary Least Squares regressions in this paper indicate that these residuals
25
are non-normally distributed (W=0.6973, p<0.01). To overcome some of the problems associ-
ated with non-normally distributed error terms, I use the following bootstrapping method.15
First, given that the original sample contains n observations, I obtain 1,000 resamples by
sampling with replacement n observations from the original sample. Second, I estimate b
parameters βbk for each bootstrap sample k. Finally, the mean and standard error of each
parameter can be calculated on the basis of the bootstrap parameter estimates. That is, the
bootstrap parameter mean equals 1K
∑K
k=1 β
b
k and the bootstrap estimate of standard error
equals [ 1K−1
∑K
k=1(β
b
k − 1K
∑
βbk)
2]
1
2 , in which K=1,000.
This procedure ensures that the validity of inferences about the parameter estimates
is much less dependent on the empirical distribution of the error terms. Furthermore, an
advantage of this bootstrapping method is that the method is valid in the presence of het-
eroskedasticity and that the results of this method can be expected to be fairly similar to
those from using a heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator (Davidson and
MacKinnon, 1993).16
(ii) Analysts’ Forecasting Superiority
Table 7 reports the bootstrap estimates of regressions predicting consensus forecast errors as a
function of the unpredictability rank (UP), ﬁrms’ size (SIZE), analyst following (FOLLOW)
and indicator variables denoting diﬀerent attributes of accounting changes. The objective
of this regression analysis is to determine whether the relation between analysts’ forecast
errors and ex-ante earnings predictability is less pronounced after a ﬁrm has adopted more
informative accounting procedures. The indicator variables DAC, DAFTER, DDISC, DEBEI
(denoting the presence of EBEI changes), and DPRED are included in the regressions but not
reported in Table 7.
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[Table 7 about here.]
The coeﬃcient of the unpredictability rank (UP) is signiﬁcantly positive at the 0.01 alpha
level (0.0526, t=3.06). A higher unpredictability score thus implies lower forecast accuracy
in the years prior to an accounting change. The results also reveal that the association
between earnings predictability and forecast accuracy decreases due to earnings predictability
improving changes, i.e. CCA to HCA changes and changes from expensing to capitalisation
(t=−3.45, p<0.01). This implies that the newly adopted accounting procedures, i.e. historical
cost accounting and capitalisation of costs, are more informative than the previously used
procedures, which increases analysts’ forecasting superiority. When I replace DPREDUP with
DExpCapUP and DCcaHcaUP, where DExpCap (DCcaHca) denotes an indicator variable that
equals 1 in year t+1 and t+2 if the ﬁrm has adopted a change from expensing to capitalisation
(CCA to HCA change) in year t, the results are similar (not reported). These results support
hypothesis 6.
The positive sign of the coeﬃcient on DEBEIDACUP (0.1223, t=1.72, p<0.10) suggests
weakly that EBEI changes, in comparison with non-EBEI changes, strengthen the relation
between predictability and accuracy, unless the accounting change is previously disclosed.
The marginally negative coeﬃcient on DEBEIDDISCUP (−0.1650, t=−1.82, p<0.10) suggests
that prior disclosure results in a situation in which the association between predictability
and accuracy almost fully disappears. These coeﬃcients indicate that analysts’ forecasting
superiority over mechanical prediction models decreases after EBEI changes. An explana-
tion for this is that after these accounting changes, the change eﬀect becomes a distinctive
factor in determining forecast accuracy, both for analysts and mechanical prediction models,
which decreases analysts’ forecasting superiority. However, when EBEI changes are previously
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disclosed, analysts’ information advantage over mechanical prediction models is signiﬁcant,
resulting in an increase in analysts’ forecasting superiority. Although the previous analyses
indicated that the accounting change eﬀect on average does not negatively aﬀect analysts’
forecast accuracy, these results suggest that the change eﬀect can be an important determi-
nant of the composition of analysts’ forecast error.
6 CONCLUSIONS
This study assesses the inﬂuence of discretionary accounting changes on analysts’ forecast
errors in the Netherlands. The accounting information set that analysts following Dutch
companies access after an accounting change is less informative than before the change, since
Dutch companies rarely restate ﬁgures for prior years in the historical summary. Despite this,
I ﬁnd that accounting changes with a material inﬂuence on earnings before extraordinary items
(EBEI changes) do not impair forecast accuracy in the change year or in the years after the
change. Additional tests indicate that forecast accuracy improvements in the presence of EBEI
changes can be attributed to decreases in the level of information asymmetry. This suggests
that EBEI changes are on average part of an improvement in the company’s information
environment.
The empirical analysis further reveals that the importance of the earnings predictability
measure in explaining consensus forecast errors varies with management’s accounting choice.
This suggests that analysts forecasting superiority over mechanical prediction models diﬀers
when accounting systems diﬀer. Furthermore, the fact that accounting changes to historical
cost accounting and capitalisation of costs causes analysts’ forecast errors to be not only
more accurate but also less correlated with forecast errors of mechanical earnings prediction
models, indicates that these accounting methods oﬀer better information to important users
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of accounting information.
Notes
1Brown et al. (1985) suggest that short-term forecasts incorporate transitory earnings components,
after ﬁnding that long-term forecasts are more valuation relevant than short-term forecasts. Bandy-
opadhyay et al. (1995) also observe a diﬀerence in valuation relevance between long-term forecasts and
short-term forecasts.
2The ﬁve percent rule is a materiality criterion that is often used in Dutch guidelines for ﬁnancial
reporting. I classify accounting changes with a material eﬀect on both earnings before extraordinary
items and net proﬁt as EBEI-changes.
3I realise that accounting changes can be disclosed in reports other than prior annual reports.
However, excluding interim disclosure of changes ensures that all individual one-year-horizon earnings
forecasts can be assumed to be aﬀected by prior disclosure. Using only this type of disclosure may
understate the impact of prior disclosure, i.e. reduce the signiﬁcance of the empirical results.
4For example, Basu et al. (1998) provide evidence that the use of more accrual basis accounting than
cash basis accounting results in higher earnings predictability. They measure earnings predictability
on the basis of earnings variability and analysts’ earnings forecast errors.
5The Financial Accounting Policy Committee of the Association for Investment Management and
Research also expressed concerns over the eﬀect of current cost accounting on the volatility of reported
earnings (AIMR, 1993, p. 43). A closer examination of the changes from current cost accounting to
historical cost accounting used in this study shows that it is reasonable to assume that these changes
smooth reported earnings. In ﬁfty percent of the cases I could obtain both earnings based on current
cost accounting and earnings based on historical cost accounting of change ﬁrms from 1988 up to
the change year. It appears from these data that absolute changes in ‘current cost’ earnings are
signiﬁcantly higher than absolute changes in ‘historical cost’ earnings. The mean diﬀerence equals 1.9
percent of lagged earnings (Wilcoxon z-value = 3.219, p<0.01), and 6.0 percent of changes in ’historical
cost’ earnings.
6Some studies indicate that small ﬁrms prefer capitalisation, whereas large ﬁrms prefer expens-
ing (see e.g. Trombley, 1989). As a consequence the relationship between capitalisation versus expens-
ing and forecast accuracy can be dependent on the relationship between size and accuracy. Financial
analysts’ earnings forecasts are generally found to be more accurate for larger ﬁrms (see e.g. Lys and
Soo, 1995; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). This would imply that changes from capitalisation to expensing
lead to higher forecast accuracy. Since it is unlikely that changes from expensing to capitalisation are
adopted by large ﬁrms becoming small ﬁrms, these changes are not subject to size eﬀects and probably
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more useful when studying whether the choice between capitalisation and expensing aﬀects forecast
accuracy.
7For instance, the Shapiro-Wilk statistic of diﬀerences between absolute initial one-year-horizon
forecast errors in change years and in the ﬁrst year prior to the change year equals 0.5022 (p<0.01).
8Due to limitations of the data set matched pairs are formed by two forecasts of one broker, which
in theory does not necessarily coincide with two forecasts of one analyst. Analyst codes are available
for 68.6 percent of the observations. Examinations of this subset reveal that in 5.1 percent of all ﬁrm-
broker-year-horizon observations diﬀerent analysts of one broker submitted earnings forecasts for the
same ﬁrm, year and horizon. In 8.5 percent of these cases submissions were not fully sequential, that
is, not likely to be caused by succession. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a vast majority of
the ﬁrms is followed by only one analyst per broker
9The data used in this study appear to be severely skewed. For instance, the skewness coeﬃcient
of diﬀerences between absolute initial forecast errors in change years and in the ﬁrst year prior to the
change equals 8.9846 (p<0.01), the skewness coeﬃcient of diﬀerences between absolute initial forecast
errors in the ﬁrst year after the change and in the ﬁrst year before the change equals 3.5139 (p<0.01).
However, I recalculated the Wilcoxon signed ranks when using a bootstrapping method. This indicated
that the bootstrap means are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the reported signed ranks.
10Furthermore, when using prior period forecast errors as the benchmark, the question presents itself
whether lifecycles inﬂuence the results. That is, are ﬁrms becoming more stable over time and does
this explain the change in accounting principles? It can be expected that the inﬂuence of lifecycles is
rather limited, since the ﬁrms that are listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange are to a large extent
mature ﬁrms. Moreover, the adoption of accounting changes which are studied in this paper was not
restricted to the smaller ﬁrms.
11I divide the ﬁrms into eleven categories according to the level of analyst following in the change
year. I expect that the ﬁrms which are in the same categories, have comparable information environ-
ments and that changes in forecast accuracy through the years are comparable for these ﬁrms.
12Although usually earnings changes are regressed on abnormal stock returns, it has been proven
that earnings levels should also be associated with abnormal stock returns (see, for example, Easton
and Harris, 1991; Ohlson and Shroﬀ, 1992; Strong and Walker, 1993). Furthermore, I expect that
total returns exhibit stronger correlation with earnings than abnormal returns, since problems with
estimating normal returns may induce additional error (see also Beaver et al., 1987).
13Beaver et al. (1987) show that when regressing changes in stock prices on earnings it makes little
diﬀerence whether stock returns are inclusive or exclusive of dividends. This result most likely applies
to listed companies in the Netherlands, since, in correspondence with US companies, dividends paid
out by Dutch companies are relatively small. Stock returns are adjusted for stock splits and stock
30
dividends.
14The mean unpredictability rank of ﬁrms adopting CCA to HCA changes is signiﬁcantly lower in the
two years after the adoption than in the two years before the adoption (the diﬀerence equals −0.5155,
t=−2.16, p<0.05). The mean rank of ﬁrms adopting changes from expensing to capitalisation is not
signiﬁcantly lower (the diﬀerence equals −0.1675, t=−0.48).
15An example of a study on earnings forecasting that also makes use of bootstrap regression is that
of Kross et al. (1990).
16White’s tests indicate that in the error regressions the data are heteroskedastic (Chi-square=42.692,
df 10, p<0.01).
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Table 1:
Description and distribution of accounting changes adopted by
Dutch companies from 1988 to 1996
Type of accounting change 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 Total
Panel A: Description and distribution of accounting changes
Revenue recognition 7 5 4 1 2 3 3 3 1 29
Current cost to historical cost 2 1 1 4 3 2 1 3 5 22
Provisions 4 2 1 4 2 4 1 18
Capitalisation to expensing 1 3 3 5 1 13
expensing to capitalisation 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 12
Cost recognition 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 10
Miscellaneous asset valuation principles 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 8
Foreign currency translation 1 2 1 1 5
Valuation of participations 1 2 1 1 5
Historical cost to current cost 1 2 3
Miscellaneous 0
EBEI changes 14 13 10 3 13 6 5 8 8 80
Non-EBEI changes 3 4 9 5 6 5 0 9 4 45
Total 17 17 19 8 19 11 5 17 12 125
Panel B: Number of accounting changes included
All accounting changes 125
Preceded or followed by other change 10
No forecast data available 13
No price data available 23
Total included changes 79
Less: more than one change per year 13
Total included ﬁrm-year observations 66
Total included ﬁrms 56
Data Source: The accounting change data come from the annual reports of 243 companies listed on the
Amsterdam Stock Exchange during 1988 to 1996 for one or more years. Stock prices are from Datastream,
analysts’ earnings forecast data are from I/B/E/S.
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Table 2:
Descriptive statistics of analysts’ forecast errors, forecast horizon
and analyst following in the ﬁve years surrounding the
accounting change
Years of
Variablea observationb #obs.c Mean SD Skewness Q3 Median Q1
Individual forecast t-2 686 0.0420 0.1162 4.0985 0.0190 0.0071 0.0023
error t-1 934 0.0176 0.0320 4.5440 0.0193 0.0078 0.0026
t 1,079 0.0281 0.0692 8.3306 0.0183 0.0068 0.0023
t+1 992 0.0462 0.1135 3.6517 0.0207 0.0051 0.0022
t+2 852 0.0176 0.0346 5.7270 0.0189 0.0063 0.0019
Forecast horizon t-2 686 173.05 113.18 -0.60 250 203 104
t-1 934 175.02 119.63 -0.27 253 200 105
t 1,079 172.77 109.56 -0.88 254 204 108
t+1 992 183.29 104.25 -0.99 258 220 115
t+2 852 169.83 106.92 -0.79 251 197 106
Analyst following t-2 686 22.18 9.16 -0.02 29 21 16
t-1 934 24.55 9.84 -0.25 33 23 18
t 1,079 25.78 10.21 -0.58 33 27 20
t+1 992 28.04 10.72 -0.75 37 31 22
t+2 852 30.68 10.19 -1.15 38 34 25
a The variables have the following deﬁnitions:
Forecast horizion = The number of days between the submission of the individual earnings forecast
and the ﬁscal year end.
Analyst following = The number of analysts that has submitted at least one earnings forecast for the
same company in the same year.
b Year t denotes the year in which the accounting change is adopted.
c Descriptive statistics are based on all available earnings forecasts for the companies that are included
in my sample.
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Table 3:
Comparison of analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy in the change year
and years after the change with forecast accuracy in the year prior to
the change
perc. z-statistic z-statistic
change Rank Sum change ﬁrms> Rank Sum EBEI>
#obs ﬁrmsc Rank Sum control groupd Rank Sum non-EBEI e
Panel A: Change year vs. year before changea
EBEI changesb 456 45.8% -2.20‡ -3.51†
(-1.62)
Non-EBEI changes 317 57.4% 1.96‡
(3.71)†
Panel B: First year after vs. year before change
EBEI changes 329 38.9% -0.01 -3.14†
(-2.72)†
Non-EBEI changes 249 55.0% 2.28‡
(2.24)‡
Panel C: Second year after vs. year before change
EBEI changes 233 30.9% -1.24 -4.59†
(-5.73)†
Non-EBEI changes 146 56.2% 1.14
(1.51)
a Panel A, panel B and panel C compare forecast errors in the year prior to the change year with
forecast errors in the change year, ﬁrst year after the change year and second year after the change
year, respectively.
b
EBEI = Accounting changes that have a material inﬂuence (of 5 percent or more) on
earnings before extraordinary items.
Non-EBEI = Accounting changes that have a material inﬂuence (of 5 percent or more) on net
earnings or equity but do not aﬀect earnings before extraordinary items materially.
c Percentage of cases in which analysts’ individual forecast errors in change years are greater than
their forecast errors in prior years. Z-statistics of Wilcoxon signed rank tests on diﬀerences in
forecast errors are in parentheses.
d Z-statistics of Wilcoxon rank sum tests, which indicate whether the rank sum of diﬀerences in
forecast error in the change ﬁrm sample is signiﬁcantly greater than the rank sum of diﬀerences in
the control sample. These statistics are based on the mean rank sum of 500 control samples.
e Z-statistics of Wilcoxon rank sum tests, which indicate whether the rank sum of diﬀerences in
forecast error from the ﬁrms adopting EBEI changes is signiﬁcantly greater than the rank sum of
diﬀerences from the ﬁrms adopting non-EBEI changes.
†,‡,∗ Signiﬁcant at the two-tailed 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 alpha level, respectively.
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Table 4:
The inﬂuence of previously disclosed versus non-disclosed accounting
changes on earnings forecast accuracy
perc. z-statistic z-statistic
change Rank Sum change ﬁrms> Rank Sum PD>
#obs ﬁrmsb Rank Sum control groupc Rank Sum NPDd
Panel A: EBEI changes
Prior disclosurea 159 35.2% -2.35‡ -3.76†
(-6.04)†
No prior disclosure 297 51.5% -1.06
(1.23)
Panel B: Non-EBEI changes
Prior disclosure 157 61.1% 3.65† 2.10‡
(3.75)†
No prior disclosure 160 53.8% -0.95
(1.44)
a
Prior disclosure (PD) = Management’s intention to change accounting procedures
has been disclosed in the annual report of the ﬁrst year
prior to the change year.
No prior disclosure (NPD) = Management’s intention to change accounting procedures
has not been disclosed in the annual report of the ﬁrst
year prior to the change year.
b Percentage of cases in which analysts’ individual forecast errors in change years are greater
than their forecast errors in prior years. Z-statistics of Wilcoxon signed rank tests on diﬀer-
ences in forecast errors are in parentheses.
c Z-statistics of Wilcoxon rank sum tests, which indicate whether the rank sum of diﬀerences
in forecast error in the change ﬁrm sample is signiﬁcantly greater than the rank sum of
diﬀerences in the control sample. These statistics are based on the mean rank sum of 500
control samples.
d Z-statistics of Wilcoxon rank sum tests, which indicate whether the rank sum of diﬀerences
in forecast error from the PD-ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly greater than the rank sum of diﬀerences
from the NPD-ﬁrms.
†,‡,∗ Signiﬁcant at the two-tailed 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 alpha level, respectively.
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Table 5:
The inﬂuence of changes in analyst following, changes in forecast
horizon and changes in stock return volatility on signed ranks.
Dependent variable is the signed ranks of changes in analysts’
individual forecast errora
#obs Model Intercept ∆Follow ∆Horizon DSTD adj.R2
Panel A: Change year vs. year before change
EBEI changes 456 Model 1 -30.2765 -0.9555 0.3836 - 0.0396
(-2.23)‡ (-0.33) (4.32)†
Model 2 1.5537 -3.7318 0.3705 -50.5757 0.0494
(0.07) (-1.16) (4.17)† (-1.91)∗
non-EBEI changes 317 Model 1 4.5638 14.7993 0.1488 - 0.0386
(0.48) (6.33)† (2.07)‡
Model 2 78.3994 10.2660 0.1528 -138.4266 0.2790
(6.05)† (4.49)† (2.22)† (-7.59)‡
Panel B: First year after vs. year before change
EBEI changes 329 Model 1 -13.1781 -4.6883 0.2290 0.0477
(-0.89) (-2.01)‡ (3.15)†
Model 2 19.5587 -6.8285 0.2088 -61.4809 0.0707
(1.06) (-2.97)† (2.80)† (-3.14)†
non-EBEI changes 249 Model 1 -17.5844 6.1506 0.3152 0.1459
(-1.26) (3.17)† (5.67)†
Model 2 -11.5934 6.8082 0.3081 -27.6038 0.1570
(-0.82) (3.47)† (5.52)† (-1.44)
a Independent variables are:
∆FOLLOW= Change in analyst following, deﬁned as the company-speciﬁc number of analysts
that has submitted at least one earnings forecast for the same company in the
same year.
∆HORIZON= Change in forecast horizon, deﬁned as the forecast-speciﬁc number of days between
the I/B/E/S forecast submission date and the ﬁscal year end.
DSTD= Indicator variable that equals one if the standard deviation of abnormal stock
returns has decreased after the publication of the annual report of year t-1.
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Table 6:
The inﬂuence of changes from current cost accounting to historical cost
accounting and changes from expensing to capitalisation on analysts’
forecast accuracy
perc. z-statistic z-statistic
change Rank Sum change ﬁrms> Rank Sum EPI>
#obs ﬁrmsb Rank Sum control groupc Rank Sum Otherd
Panel A: EBEI changes
CCA to HCAa 190 29.5% -11.64† -4.98†
(-8.30)†
Exp to Cap 77 32.5% 4.33† 0.09
(-2.18)‡
Other changes 295 40.4% 2.35‡
(-1.23)
Panel B: Non-EBEI changes
CCA to HCA 148 39.9% -2.65† -6.70†
(-3.69)†
Exp to Cap 96 60.4% 1.97‡ -3.96†
(2.33)‡
Other changes 151 67.5% 4.65†
(6.93)†
a
CCA-HCA = Changes from current cost accounting to historical cost accounting.
Exp to Cap = Changes from expensing to capitalisation.
b Percentage of cases in which analysts’ individual forecast errors in the two years after the ac-
counting change are greater than their forecast errors in prior years. Z-statistics of Wilcoxon
signed rank tests on diﬀerences in forecast errors are in parentheses.
c Z-statistics of Wilcoxon rank sum tests, which indicate whether the rank sum of diﬀerences
in forecast error in the change ﬁrm sample is signiﬁcantly greater than the rank sum of
diﬀerences in the control sample. These statistics are based on the mean rank sum of 500
control samples.
d Z-statistics of Wilcoxon rank sum tests, which indicate whether the rank sum of diﬀerences
in forecast error from the ﬁrms adopting CCA to HCA changes or Exp to Cap changes
(earnings predictability improving changes (EPI)) is signiﬁcantly greater than the rank sum
of diﬀerences from the ﬁrms adopting all other accounting changes.
†,‡,∗ Signiﬁcant at the two-tailed 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 alpha level, respectively.
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Table 7:
Regression analysis of forecast errors and earnings predictability
measures. Dependent variable is analysts’ consensus forecast errora
Model (1) Model (2)
Independent variable Mean t-value p-value Mean t-value p-value
Intercept 0.0338 3.23 0.001 0.0228 1.66 0.098
UP 0.0526 3.06 0.002 0.0526 3.08 0.002
FOLLOW −0.0002 −0.28 0.780 −0.0001 −0.10 0.920
SIZE 0.0006 1.50 0.135 0.0006 1.27 0.205
DACUP 0.0775 1.30 0.195 −0.0171 −0.61 0.542
DDISCUP −0.1059 −1.72 0.087 0.0088 0.20 0.842
DAFTERUP 0.0100 0.44 0.660 −0.0031 −0.13 0.897
DPREDUP −0.0549 −3.48 0.001 −0.0532 −3.45 0.001
DEBEIDACUP − − − 0.1223 1.72 0.087
DEBEIDDISCUP − − − −0.1650 −1.82 0.070
DEBEIDAFTERUP − − − 0.0164 0.76 0.448
adj. R2 0.4089 0.4396
#obs.b 260 260
a
UP= unpredictability measure based on a random walk model, an au-
toregressive model and a returns model
FOLLOW= number of analysts that follows ﬁrm i in year t
SIZE= market value of common equity of ﬁrm i at the ﬁscal year-end
in 109 GLD
DAC= indicator variable, equals 1 if ﬁrm i adopts a material accounting
change in year t
DDISC= indicator variable, equals 1 (in year t) if ﬁrm i has disclosed the
intention to change accounting procedures in the annual report of
year t-1
DAFTER= indicator variable, equals 1 (in year t) if ﬁrm i has adopted an
accounting change in year t-1 or in year t-2
DPRED= indicator variable, equals 1 (in year t) if ﬁrm i has adopted changes
from current cost accounting to historical cost accounting or changes
from expensing to capitalisation in year t-1 or in year t-2
DEBEI= indicator variable, equals 1 if ﬁrm i has adopted an accounting
change with a material eﬀect on earnings before extraordinary items
in the years t-2, t-1, t, t+1 or t+2
b The data used to estimate the regression are from two years prior to the accounting
change, the change year and two years after the accounting change.
Number of observations:
Firm-year observations (66) times 5 = 330
less: years before 1988 or after 1996 = 52
less: not listed in one or more years = 4
less: other accounting change in one or more years = 6
less: no forecast data available in one or more years = 3
less: no rank scores available = 5
Total observations = 260
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